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Upon the death of a king or queen, the proclamation “the king is dead, long live 
the king” announces a new monarch’s accession to the throne, preserving the 
sovereign order. As the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)
1
 is 
implemented, it is tempting to proclaim the reign of a new system of health 
insurance. But, will it preserve the old order or initiate a new form of governance? 
As states and insurers grapple with new rules and regulations being issued from the 
Department of Health and Human Services, the Treasury Department and the 
Department of Labor, one might believe an entirely new health insurance system is 
being built. Yet, the ACA is designed to preserve existing forms of public and 
private health insurance, such as Medicare and private employer group health plans, 
which will continue to operate much as they have in the recent past.
2
 What has 
changed is the role that insurance will play and how that will shape the way we think 
about health policy.  
Under the ACA, health insurance will function more like social insurance than 
conventional indemnity insurance.
3
 Consequently, the new queen may look more 
like a prime minister—no longer reigning as a sovereign, but responsible to her 
subjects and accountable to their governing institutions. This represents a notable 
change, but it is less dramatic than one might suspect, as health insurance has long 
functioned differently from other categories of insurance.  
Health insurance no longer operates like conventional life or car insurance, as it 
did in the 1950s and 1960s, when health insurance began displacing direct cash 
payments from patients to physicians. Blue Cross and Blue Shield offered indemnity 
policies to reimburse patients for fees patients paid to physicians and hospitals.
4
 
Even then, however, Blue Cross and Blue Shield characterized their policies not as 
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1 Patient Protection & Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 21, 25, 26, 29, 42 U.S.C.).  
2 See generally PAUL STARR, REMEDY AND REACTION: THE PECULIAR AMERICAN STRUGGLE 
OVER HEALTH CARE REFORM 177 (2011).  
3 See id. at 241-47. 
4  See generally ROBERT CUNNINGHAM III & ROBERT CUNNINGHAM, JR., THE BLUES: A 
HISTORY OF THE BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD SYSTEM (1997). 
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insurance, but as hospital and medical service payment plans, respectively; and they 
were governed by state laws similar to, but distinct from, other insurance licensure 
statutes.
5
 As healthcare costs rose, commercial insurers entered the market with 
indemnity policies. In the early years, insurers typically paid whatever prices 
hospitals and physicians charged, but today’s insurers negotiate prices with 
providers, and large insurers that have substantial bargaining power can set their 
own prices. Insurers also added managed care components to their plans to control 
costs,
6
 and in many cases insurance coverage determines the kind of care that 
patients receive in practice. 
Today, health insurance is no longer simply a class of insurance that covers 
risks to health, and it has not been so for many years.
7
 Part II argues that health 
insurance has become a unique form of insurance—a mechanism to pay for 
healthcare that uses risk spreading as one of several pricing methods.
8
 Part III 
explains how the ACA builds on this important payment function to create a 
complex social insurance system to finance healthcare for (almost) everyone. Health 
insurance is now so integrated into the healthcare system that we can no longer have 
one without the other. This shift poses challenges to laws governing health insurance 
policies. Part IV, therefore, examines how the ACA draws on various conceptions of 
insurance to produce a quasi-social insurance system. Such a system poses new 
challenges to laws governing insurance, not all of which are resolved by the ACA 
itself. I conclude that, whether or not the ACA is fully implemented, health 
insurance has already changed—but more nuanced questions remain about whether 
and how laws governing insurance licensure and claims determinations should also 
change.  
II.  CHARACTERISTICS OF HEALTH INSURANCE 
Health insurance today differs from other classes of insurance in three critical 
respects.
9
 First, it is the primary source of payment for medical care in the United 
States.
10
 Second, because everyone needs healthcare, almost everyone needs health 
                                                 
5 ROBERT D. EILERS, REGULATION OF BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD PLANS 135-36 (1963). For 
an example of such licensure statutes, see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 176A (2012 & Supp. 2013), 176C 
(2012).  
6 See generally ALAIN C. ENTHOVEN, HEALTH PLAN: THE ONLY PRACTICAL SOLUTION TO THE 
SOARING COST OF MEDICAL CARE (1980); Gail Jensen et al., The New Dominance of Managed Care: 
Insurance Trends in the 1990’s, 16 HEALTH AFF. 125 (1997); Marsha Gold, Can Managed Care and 
Competition Control Medicare Costs? , W3 HEALTH AFF. 176 (2003), 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2003/04/02/hlthaff.w3.176.full.pdf?origin=pub lication_d
etail.  
7 See generally Jon Gabel et al., The Changing World of Group Health Insurance, 7 HEALTH 
AFF. 48 (1988); Jon Gabel et al., Withering on the Vine: The Decline of Indemnity Health Insurance , 
19 HEALTH AFF. 152 (2000); Wendy K. Mariner, Social Solidarity and Personal Responsibility in 
Health Reform, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 199, 206-13 (2008). 
8 Wendy K. Mariner, Health Reform: What’s Insurance Got to Do with It? Recognizing Health 
Insurance as a Separate Species of Insurance , 36 AM. J.L. MED. 436, 438 (2010); Nat’l Fed’n of 
Indep. Bus. (NFIB) v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2620 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in the 
judgment in part and concurring in the judgment in part).  
9 See generally Brief of 104 Health Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, 
NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/briefs/11 -
398_petitioneramcu104healthlawprofs.authcheckdam.pdf (written together with Mark Hall, the aut hor 
who organized and participated in drafting the brief (along with Abbe Gluck), the characteristics of 
which are described in Part II, infra.) 
10 Id. at 16. 
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insurance to pay for that care.
11
 Third, health insurance is no longer designed like 
conventional insurance policies and thus no longer functions like conventional 
insurance.
12
 Any one of these characteristics is enough to distinguish health 
insurance from conventional indemnity insurance, but together they make health 
insurance unique. Indeed, healthcare may be the only market that could not exist in 




A. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE COVERAGE PAYS FOR MOST MEDICAL CARE 
Americans pay for most of their healthcare with health insurance, not cash. In 
2009, they used public and private insurance to pay for 85.7% of their personal 
healthcare expenditures.
14
 Only 12.8% was paid out-of-pocket for insurance 
deductibles and co-payments, over-the-counter medication costs and other health 
service expenses not covered by insurance.
15
  
The vast majority of health insurance payments go directly to providers to pay 
for care—medical services, procedures, medications and devices.
16
 The practice of 
reimbursing patients for their out-of-pocket payments to providers is the exception 
today.
17
 When a person needs medical care, her health insurance pays the physicians, 
hospitals and laboratories for the services rendered to the patient. In this respect, 
both private commercial health insurance and public benefit programs like Medicare 
function in the same manner. Thus, the average person is likely to think of her health 
plan as the entity that pays for her medical care. To be sure, insurance does not pay 
for some services, but these are the minority—accounting for less than fifteen 
percent of national personal health expenditures.
18
 
There is no other product that is purchased with insurance benefits. One might 
argue that repairs to one’s house or car are often paid directly by homeowners or car 
insurance. However, that analogy ignores an important distinction. Individuals do 
not seek repairs in a vacuum. First, they must buy a house or a car with money from 
their own assets or a loan. Then they may buy insurance to pay for any repairs 
needed in the future. Later, if damage occurs, they may call upon insurance to pay 
for repairs, but they do not use car insurance proceeds to buy the car in the first 
place.  
In contrast, individuals seek health insurance to buy the initial “product”  —
healthcare—before seeking that care. One might claim that health insurance is like a 
car loan obtained to buy the car in the first place, except that the “loan” does not 
have to be repaid. Health insurance is not analogous to car insurance, unless we 
                                                 
11 See id. at 5. 
12 Mariner, supra note 8, at 443. 
13 See Brief of 104 Health Law Professors, supra note 9, at 7-10. 
14
 CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES BY TYPE OF SERVICE AND SOURCE OF FUNDS, CY1960-2012, 
available at http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-
Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/NationalHealthAccountsHistorical.html (last modified Jan. 7, 
2014). 
15 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED 
STATES: 2012, 102 tbl.135 (2012), available at 
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012edition.html (select “Section 3: Health and Nutrition” 
from the menu).  
16 Id. at 104. 
17 Id. at 102. 
18 Id. 
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consider the human body to be the original product and health insurance as the 
source of payment for repairs to the body. Of course, the human body is not a 




In his opinion on the ACA’s individual mandate in National Federation of 
Independent Business v. Sebelius, Chief Justice John Roberts rejected the idea that 
health insurance differs from car insurance.
 20
 Very few things are purchased for 
their own sake, he asserted: a car is purchased for transportation to go places.
21
 If 
health insurance is similarly purchased for an ultimate purpose, as the Chief Justice 
implied, that purpose can only be to buy healthcare, which, under his reasoning, is 
itself purchased for the further purpose of getting well. This theory makes 
analogies—a mainstay of legal reasoning—unmanageable. At issue is the source of 
payment for products or services like cars and healthcare. Intangible states of being, 
like going places and getting well, are not products that can be bought. Buying 
health insurance is at least one step too far removed from buying a car to satisfy the 
Chief Justice’s attempt at analogy. 
A. THE UNIVERSAL NEED FOR HEALTH INSURANCE 
Insurance is used to pay for most healthcare because healthcare is often 
extremely expensive and unpredictable. To be sure, some other purchases can be 
expensive and unpredictable. But, healthcare is not an optional good. Almost 
everyone needs some sort of healthcare at one time or another during their lives.
22
  
The National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) reports that only 1% of adults 
have never visited a healthcare professional in their lifetimes.
23
 Of course, the need 
for healthcare varies over a lifetime. Yet, most Americans use healthcare frequently. 
The same NCHS survey reports that 95.9% of adults had visited a healthcare 
professional within the preceding 5 years, and 82.5% had done so within the 
preceding year.
24
 Children see healthcare providers even more often.
25
  
Much of this care is expensive. National health expenditures accounted for 
17.9% of the United States GDP in 2011, totaling about $2.7 trillion.
26
 Life-saving 
care is especially expensive, with organ transplants costing hundreds of thousands of 
dollars.
27
 Coronary artery bypass surgery cost $86,914 at private insurance rates in 
                                                 
19 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.  
20 NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2591 (2012) (Roberts, C.J.).  
21 Id. See also Kenneth S. Abraham, Four Conceptions of Insurance, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 
671 (2013) (arguing that automobile insurance is second to health insurance in its importance to well -
being, because “[i]n all but urban areas where there is adequate mass transit, driving is an essential 
feature of daily life”).  
22 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2610 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in the judgment in part and concurring in the 
judgement in part).  
23 Nat’l Ctr. for Health Statistics, Summary Health Statistics for U.S. Adults: National Health 
Interview Survey, 2009, 10 VITAL & HEALTH STAT. 1, 124 (2010), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_10/sr10_249.pdf.  
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 6. 
26 Micah Hartman et al., National Health Spending in 2011: Overall Growth Remains Low, but 
Some Players and Services Show Signs of Acceleration , 32 HEALTH AFF. 87, 88 exh. 1 (2013). 
27 T. SCOTT BENTLEY & STEVEN G. HANSON, 2011 U.S. ORGAN AND TISSUE TRANSPLANT COST 
ESTIMATES AND DISCUSSION 3 tbl.1 (2011), available at 
http://www.publications.milliman.com/research/health-rr/pdfs/2011-us-organ-tissue.pdf. 
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2005.
28
 Few Americans can pay for such care out-of-pocket. In 2009, the median 
household income in the U.S. was $49,777,
29
 and the median net worth was about 
$120,000.
30
 More than half the population does not have enough income or assets to 
pay for this type of care. 
The cost is exacerbated by the unpredictability of major illnesses and injuries.
31
 
One never really knows when a devastating medical crisis will occur. This makes it 
difficult, if not impossible, to plan or save for future care. Moreover, when illness 
strikes, patients have little control over the treatments they receive—and therefore 
their costs—typically relying on physician recommendations. Thus, patients are 
often faced with the kind of personal and financial crises that can only be financed 
by the cost-spreading techniques of insurance.  
Of course, insurance is useful for expensive and unpredictable events, such as 
the loss of one’s house in a fire or flood. But, few expensive products are 
necessities. Food, water, shelter, and clothing are necessities, but they are not 
unpredictable. Unlike medical care, these necessities are essentially the same for all 
human beings. The quantity and quality sufficient to sustain survival are predictable. 
Also unlike medical care, consumers can choose what clothes, housing, and food to 
buy without professional intervention. These necessities generally are available at 
affordable prices. To be sure, too many indigent persons are unable to afford healthy 
food and safe housing without social assistance. Nevertheless, there is no imperative 
to use insurance to buy food, water, housing, or clothing.  
Despite many who consider healthcare to be a commercial good that should be 
allocated through commercial markets, more Americans treat healthcare like a 
necessity and a public good.
32
 The public generally responds to an individual in an 
emergency by providing rescue.
33
 Professional medical ethics has long recognized 
physicians’ responsibilities to help patients in an emergency.
34
 State court decisions 
have incorporated this ethic into common law, while state and federal legislation has 
codified it for hospitals with emergency departments, requiring care for emergency 
medical conditions regardless of ability to pay.
35
 Even though limited to 
emergencies, this sense of responsibility distinguishes medical care from 
commercial goods. Medical facilities do not refuse care to anyone whose life could 
be saved by immediate intervention, whether or not the facilities will be paid for the 
services they provide. Commercial vendors, however, do not typically provide food, 
housing, or automobiles to individuals who cannot pay for them. 
                                                 
28  Zhenxiang Zhao & Melissa Winget, Economic Burden of Illness of Acute Coronary 
Syndromes: Medical and Productivity Costs, 11 BMC HEALTH SERVICES RES. 1, 3 (2011). 
29  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH 
INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2010 453 tbl.692 (2011), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/p60-239.pdf.  
30 Id. at 6 tbl.1.  
31 Joseph P. Newhouse et al., Risk Adjustment and Medicare: Taking a Closer Look , 16 HEALTH 
AFF. 26, 32-33 (1997).  
32 STARR, supra note 2, at 7-10. 
33 PAUL SLOVIC, THE FEELING OF RISK: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON RISK PERCEPTION 73 (2010); 
Karen E. Jenni & George Loewenstein, Explaining the “Identifiable Victim Effect”, 14 J. RISK & 
UNCERTAINTY 235, 237 (1997).  
34  Code of Medical Ethics § 8.11 Neglect of Patients (Am. Med. Ass’n 1996), available at 
http://www.ama-assn.org//ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-
ethics/opinion811.page.  
35 See generally Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 174 A.2d 135 (Del. 1961); Emergency 
Medical Treatment & Active Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2012).  
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C. HEALTH INSURANCE ALSO PAYS FOR PREDICTABLE AND PREVENTIVE SERVICES  
Health insurance today pays not only for needed medical care that patients 
cannot foresee, but also for many entirely planned and predictable services. These 
include preventive services like annual checkups and well-baby examinations, 
immunizations, mammograms, and similar screening procedures, as well as 
contraceptive services.  
Coverage of preventive services is an anomaly in conventional insurance. 
Expenses that are likely or certain to occur are not considered insurable risks.
36
 
Traditionally, insurance covered only risks that were unforeseeable by the insured, 
for sensible reasons.
37
 From the insured’s perspective, it makes little sense to buy 
insurance to pay for a service, like an influenza immunization, that the insured 
already plans to buy. The insurance premium would be more expensive than the 
price of the immunization alone. 
Health insurance coverage of preventive and other planned services resulted 
from both insurance regulation and market demand. State insurance licensure 
legislation introduced required coverage of selected preventive services as a matter 
of social policy.
38
 The purpose of such laws was to encourage people who might not 
bother or could not afford to get regular preventive examinations to do so in order to 
avoid more serious (and costly) diseases in the future.
39
 Mandated benefits for 
preventive services have been a common feature of insurance regulation in most 
states for many years.
40
 
Foreseeable medical care goes beyond prevention; it includes expected 
treatment for existing medical conditions. A person with diabetes, kidney disease, or 
hypertension, for example, can expect to need a variety of medical services that 
would not typically be covered by traditional commercial indemnity insurance. Both 
state and federal laws later imposed some limits, such as the length of time that 
insurers could exclude coverage of preexisting conditions.
41
 The ACA eliminates 
these and other vestiges of traditional insurance.
42
  
Even before the ACA became law, health insurance had evolved, sometimes 
voluntarily, sometimes with a push from government, into a singular species of 
insurance. The insurance “product” that Chief Justice Roberts described was already 
dying out.
43
 Health insurance no longer functioned exclusively as a way to spread 
                                                 
36 See, e.g., Stonehenge Eng’g Corp. v. Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau, 201 F.3d 296, 301-02 (4th Cir. 
2000); SCA Serv. Inc., v. Transp. Ins. Co., 646 N.E.2d 394, 397 (Mass. 1995); STEVEN PLITT ET AL., 
COUCH ON INSURANCE §§ 102.8-102.9 (3d ed. 2009); JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, STEMPEL ON INSURANCE 
CONTRACTS 27 (3d ed. 2006). 
37 Mariner, supra note 7, at 209. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 See MICHAEL MORRISEY, HEALTH INSURANCE 276 (2007) (noting growth in mandates since 
the 1970s); Mark Power & August Ralson, State Mandated Group Health Insurance Coverages, 5 
BENEFITS Q. 1, 1-10 (1989) (“The number of state health benefit mandates [has] increased 
dramatically over the past two decades . . . The number of mandates enacted increased from zero in 
1965 to approximately 200 by 1975 and then tripled to 604 through 1986 . . . [L]egislative interest in 
state mandated health insurance coverages remains high.”).  
41 See, e.g., Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), 29 U.S.C § 1182 
(2012).  
42 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-1-13 (2012). 
43  See NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2591 (2012) (“The Government argues that the 
individual mandate can be sustained . . . because health insurance is a unique product.”).  
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the risk of unforeseeable financial loss. It had become the way to pay for healthcare 
in the United States.
44
 
III. HEALTH INSURANCE AS SOCIAL INSURANCE 
Health insurance has become as necessary as healthcare.
45
 Without health 
insurance, most Americans could not obtain the healthcare they need, except in 
emergencies. The ACA was written in recognition of this reality. The goal of making 
healthcare available to all (or virtually all) could only be financed through modern 
health insurance methods. Thus, the ACA cemented a broader social function for 




In order to enable most Americans to get care, the ACA preserved the financial 
risk-spreading function of insurance for expensive care, while ending the last traces 
of risk selection and underwriting that would exclude coverage of beneficial, but 
predictable, services.
47
 These steps were necessary to make healthcare both 
affordable and available to almost the entire population, whether used by a 
government program or by private insurance.
48
 
The ACA fills the gaps in the fragmented array of public and private health 
insurance programs and links them together into a social insurance system. As Rashi 
Fein has stated, the ACA is an overall program that is “compulsory for the 
population group covered, contributory, and earmarked, with contributions that are 
not adjusted for risk and therefore are redistributive.”
49
 In this system, private health 
insurance serves a function similar to that of worker compensation insurance, 
unemployment insurance, Social Security, and Medicare; that is to say, it ensures 
that those in need of assistance have access to a source of funding for that aid.
50
 
                                                 
44 DAVID GOLDHILL, CATASTROPHIC CARE 30 (2013). 
45  See INST. OF MED., AMERICA’S UNINSURED CRISIS: CONSEQUENCES FOR HEALTH AND 
HEALTH CARE 49 (2009), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12511 (“For people 
without health insurance, there is a chasm between health care needs and access to needed services 
despite the availability of some safety net services. With health insurance, children are more likely to 
gain access to a medical home, well-child care and immunizations, prescription medications, 
appropriate care for asthma, and basic dental services. They are also more likely to have fewer 
avoidable hospitalizations, improved asthma outcomes, and fewer missed days of school. Uninsured 
adults face serious and sometime [sic] grave risk to their health. Without health insurance, adults have 
less access to effective clinical services including preventive care and,  if sick or injured, are more 
likely to suffer poorer health outcomes, greater limitations in quality of life, and premature death. 
When adults gain health insurance, they experience improved access to effective clinical services and 
better health outcomes.”).  
46 STARR, supra note 2, at 241. Care for “all,” of course, remains something of an overstatement, 
since twenty-three states, as of this writing, have declined to participate in the Medicaid expansion. 
Moreover, the ACA does not require undocumented aliens to have insurance coverage. KAISER 
FAMILY FOUND., THE IMPACT OF THE COVERAGE GAP IN STATES NOT EXPANDING MEDICAID BY RACE 
AND ETHNICITY 2 (2013), available at 
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/8527-the-impact-of-the-coverage-gap-in-
states-not-expanding-medicaid.pdf.  
47 See STARR, supra note 2, at 240-41.  
48 See generally JACOB S. HACKER, THE DIVIDED WELFARE STATE: THE BATTLE OVER PUBLIC 
AND PRIVATE SOCIAL BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (2002).  
49  Rashi Fein, Advancing a Single-Payer System of Social Insurance, in SOCIAL WELFARE 
POLICY AT THE CROSSROADS: RETHINKING THE ROLES OF SOCIAL INSURANCE, TAX EXPENDITURES, 
MANDATES, AND MEANS-TESTING 87, 87 (Robert B. Frieland et al. eds., 1994). 
50 See ROY LUBOVE, THE STRUGGLE FOR SOCIAL SECURITY 3 (1970) (“Social insurance was 
proposed as an alternative to the existing, but inefficient, system of economic assistance. Operating 
independently of the poor laws, it would respond predictably and adequately in the event of an 
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Tom Baker and Deborah Stone have noted that risks covered by insurance are 
often viewed as risks that should be shared by a community.
51
 Richard Ericson and 
colleagues explain that insurance is “a moral technology” in the sense that it 
“defines how people should act.”
52
 Jeffrey Stempel has described the insurance 
policy itself as a social institution, “often acting as adjunct arms of governance and 
reflecting social and commercial norms.”
53
 As more people are able to obtain health 
insurance, whether public or private, the idea of having health insurance becomes 
routine and expected. Because insurance is a means of spreading costs, the 
expectation of health insurance suggests that the cost of healthcare is a shared 
responsibility—at least to the extent of the benefits it covers.
54
  
In the most fundamental sense, Chief Justice Roberts was correct to characterize 
the ACA’s individual mandate as a tax.
55
 Premiums paid for social insurance 
function much like taxes. As Henry Aaron noted, the payroll taxes that fund Social 
Security and Medicare are analogous to insurance premiums, except that the payroll 
taxes are more regressive than income taxes, because they are the same percentage 
of income, up to a cap, for everyone.
56
  
In a 1927 Supreme Court case concerning taxes on insurance premiums, Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes famously wrote in a dissenting opinion, “[t]axes are what 
we pay for civilized society, including the chance to insure.”
57
 In Justice Holmes’s 
view, the premium tax is a paid for the social and economic protections provided by 
the state, including the opportunity to conduct business in a fair and secure 
environment. Today’s insurance premiums are analogous to such taxes . Even when 
paid to private industry, they finance the care needed to live and work in society. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH INSURANCE  
Why should it matter that health insurance has become the primary method of 
paying for healthcare and a form of social insurance? There are at least two reasons. 
First, the shift challenges the conventional conception of insurance as a voluntary, 
commercial relationship between insurer and insured, but it does not necessarily 
offer universally acceptable, normative standards on how insurance law should 
respond to this “new” relationship. This injects some new uncertainties into an area 
of law already beset by competing conceptions of the role of insurance in general. 
Second, recognizing health insurance as a payment system should focus more 
attention on the kinds of care that should be available to everyone. If health 
insurance is to function as a form of social insurance, who decides what coverage is 
                                                                                                                      
individual’s exposure to the long- and short-term risks which interrupted income flow: accident, 
sickness and maternity, old age and invalidity, unemployment, or death resulting in impoverished 
dependency.”).  
51 TOM BAKER, EMBRACING RISK 27 (Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon eds., 2002); Deborah Stone, 
Beyond Moral Hazard: Insurance as Moral Opportunity , 6 CONN. INS. L.J. 11, 46 (1999).  
52 RICHARD V. ERICSON ET AL., INSURANCE AS GOVERNANCE 10 (2003).  
53 Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Social Instrument and Social Institution , 51 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1489, 1495 (2010).  
54 See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & JERRY L. MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY: RETHINKING AMERICAN 
SOCIAL INSURANCE 167-71 (1999). 
55 See NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012).  
56
 Henry J. Aaron, Mandated Benefits with a Social Insurance Option, in SOCIAL WELFARE 
POLICY AT THE CROSSROADS 87, 87 (Robert B. Frieland et al. eds., 1994).  
57 Compania Gen. De Tabacos De Filipinas v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 275 U.S. 87, 100 
(1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  
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essential? Government regulation and private market contracting are likely to offer 
different, albeit also incomplete, answers. Each of these is discussed below.  
A. A SOCIAL INSURANCE CONCEPTION OF HEALTH INSURANCE 
The ACA’s social insurance conception of health insurance partially straddles 
four conceptions of insurance delineated by Kenneth Abraham.
58
 The “contract 
conception” is what Abraham calls the “traditional and dominant conception of 
insurance . . . as a contract transferring risk of loss to a party whose business is 
selling such contracts, rather than as an incident of another transaction.”
59
 The 
“product conception” views the insurance policy more like a commodity than a 
contract; the product could be found defective under rules, like products liability, 
defining the validity of contract terms, rather than generally deferring to the text of 
standard form contracts used in insurance to define rights and obligations.
60
 The 
“public utility/regulated industry conception” views insurance much like a natural 
monopoly, such as the water or electricity markets, which are highly regulated “in 
order to serve the public interest.”
61
 The “governance conception,” first propounded 
by Richard V. Ericson and colleagues,
62
 describes how insurance functions much 
like (and can serve as a substitute for) a government to the extent that it influences 
the behavior of those insured to prevent or mitigate risks.
63
 
Elements of each of these conceptions of insurance are discernable in the ACA, 
but none wholly encompasses the overall function of the healthcare financing 
methods that the ACA contemplates. Of course, Abraham’s analysis focuses on 
private insurance, whereas health insurance—pre- and post-ACA—includes both 
private plans and public programs. To be sure, the ACA intensifies regulation of 
private, commercial health insurers and their policies. Abraham notes that health 
insurance is the insurance field most closely aligned with the public utility 
conception.
64
 But he concludes that it is not a complete match, because, unlike 
public utilities, which charge consumers according to their use of the service, health 
insurance under the ACA redistributes risk.
65
 Medicare, Medicaid, and the Veterans 
Affairs health benefits programs might also share some similarities with public 
utilities, but they are more properly viewed as government benefit or entitlement 
programs—redistributive tax and transfer programs—and not regulated industries. 
 
In a social insurance system, a health plan is a means rather than an end—a 
method of financing expected costs, rather than a commercial contract or product to 
                                                 
58 Abraham, supra note 21, at 657.  
59 Id. at 658. A key focus of the contract conception is the degree to which the contract’s text 
governs the specific losses for which the insurer will pay, as well as the rules for interpreting that text.  
60 Id. at 674-75. For a discussion of the product conception, see generally Jeffrey W. Stempel, 
The Insurance Policy as Thing, 44 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 813 (2009); Daniel Schwarcz, A 
Products Liability Theory for the Judicial Regulation of Insurance Policies , 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1389 (2007). 
61 Abraham, supra note 21, at 668.  
62 ERICSON ET AL., supra note 52, at 53; see also Stempel, supra note 53, at 1495.  
63 Abraham, supra note 21, at 683-84.  
64 Id. at 670. Given the redistribution of former monopolies, such as telephone services, into 
competing private companies, the traditional public utility model that Abraham describes applies to a 
narrower set of industries today. Companies offering competing landline and mobile telephone, cable, 
or wireless internet services, for example, might offer a modified model of public utilities, with 
somewhat less regulation, especially with respect to pricing, than traditional public ut ilities.  
65 Id. at 672.  
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reimburse stipulated losses. Under the ACA, redistribution of risk—or the costs of 
healthcare—is a central goal, which is characteristic of social insurance. Thus, 
legislation and regulations are likely to dominate health policy decision-making in 
order to ensure that private health insurance plans serve the ACA’s goals. This 
contrasts with the contract conception of an entirely private market, where contracts 
are the predominant regulator of commercial relationships, rights and duties. Most 
commercial health insurance policies are ordinary consumer products that are sold in 
the market to voluntary purchasers on the basis of ability to pay, on the seller’s 
terms and conditions embodied in standard form contracts, with minimal regard to 
individual consumer needs.
66
 As discussed below, the contract conception remains 
alive and well within the ACA’s framework, because contracts will continue to 
specify many details of the insurer-insured relationship, including entitlement to 
specific treatments.
67
 Nonetheless, when insurance is used to finance a goal like 
access to healthcare, the insurance contract or “product” itself must be designed to 
achieve that goal, instead of other goals the insurer may prefer.  
In the public financing systems, like Medicare and healthcare for military 
personnel and soldiers, legislation specifies the legal and policy framework for an 
entire program, with administrative rules filling in the details. When multiple private 
insurers are used to finance healthcare, more complex regulation is needed to ensure 
that private entities, working independently, offer insurance plans that are designed 
to achieve the public goal of financing healthcare.
68
 The more a financing system 
relies on the private sector, the more regulation of private entities will be required to 
achieve the overall goal. This means that legislation and regulations will 
increasingly shape the boundaries of health insurance coverage and pricing. 
The ACA continues to rely on the states to license and regulate insurers and 
their policies, but it also imposes new federal requirements. Insurance 
commissioners now need to regulate according to federal as well as state law. This 
includes evaluating the actuarial value of qualified health plans to be sold on health 
insurance exchanges,
69
 as well as medical loss ratios, risk corridors,
70
 and risk 
adjustments.
71
 State regulators also are to work with the Secretary to develop 
uniform explanations of health plans for consumers
72
 and reporting requirements for 
insurers.
73
 Although federal funding is available to build up state regulatory capacity 
to review premium increases,
74
 many states are likely to remain underfinanced for 
the increased level of scrutiny their insurance commissioners are expected to 
provide.
75
 Some insurance departments barely have enough staff members to make 
                                                 
66 Id. at 658, 674-75. 
67 See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.  
68 See, e.g., TIMOTHY JOST, NAT’L ACAD. OF SOC. INS., THE REGULATION OF PRIVATE HEALTH 
INSURANCE 29-31 (2009), available at 
http://www.nasi.org/usr_doc/The_Regulation_of_Private_Health_Insurance.pdf (describing the 
increased frequency of regulatory interventions needed to address market failures in U.S. private 
health insurance that do not appear in a single payer system).  
69 42 U.S.C. § 18022(d)(2) (2012).  
70 Id. § 18062(a). 
71 Id. §§ 18022(c)(4), 18063. Beyond qualified plans, insurance regulators remain responsible for 
catastrophic plans, id. § 18022(e), child-only plans, id. § 18022(f), separate plans for dental and 
mental health services, grandfathered plans sold to large employers and other non-qualified plans.  
72 Id. § 300gg-15. 
73 Id. § 300gg-17.  
74 Id. § 300gg-94(c).  
75  See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 142 (5th ed. 2010) 
(describing the variation in resources available to insurance commissioners in different states).  
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sure that insurers are financially solvent, much less to review each policy for its 
actuarial soundness and compliance with pre-ACA consumer protection rules.
76
 
Now, they must also determine whether the policies offered on health insurance 
exchanges comply with all the federal rules.
77
  
State insurance departments may also need to review and approve insurers’ 
participation agreements with providers, since these agreements may be key to 
ensuring that premiums are adequate to cover expected outlays.
78
 Moreover, if 
consumers are supposed to choose health plans wisely, they may need to know how 
an insurer pays its providers and perhaps even how providers pay themselves.
79
 This 
requires more transparency than is currently provided.
80
 Payments to providers are 
likely to be the primary target for cost control. There is little dispute that such 
payments have grown faster than the cost of living or that provider prices often 
appear arbitrary.
81
 The ACA authorizes experiments to encourage providers to work 
together to provide care more efficiently at lower prices in accountable care 
organizations and other arrangements, but providers still have little incentive to 
reduce their own incomes without pressure from insurers.
82
 The degree to which 
                                                 
76  See id. at 142 (emphasizing the constrained budgets and staffing conditions in insurance 
departments).  
77 42 U.S.C. § 18021. To see how complicated this might become, consider the Final Rules under 
the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008. See 
generally External Review for Multi-State Plan Program, 78 Fed. Reg. 68,240 (Nov. 13, 2013) (to be 
codified in scattered sections of 26 and 45 C.F.R.). Health insurers have typically carved out mental 
health benefits and subcontracted with a separate insurer or organization that made coverage (and 
medical necessity) determinations largely independently, or at least their criteria were not necessarily 
applied in the same way as how the primary insurer applied its own coverage criteria for medical care. 
Primary insurers may have to do some complex mapping of coverage, deductibles, co-pays, 
participating providers, and numbers of visits to establish parity. Insurance commissioners may have 
to review and approve such parity estimates. 
78 Providers are aware of the external pressure to keep their prices low, but are consolidating in 
order to gain bargaining power. Most estimates say that consolidation typically yields a three percent 
increase in prices. Health Care Industry Consolidation: Hearing Before the Comm. on Ways & Means 
Subcomm. on Health, 112th Cong. 13-18 (2011) (statement of Martin Gaynor, E.J. Baron Professor of 
Economics and Health Policy, Heinz College, Carnegie Mellon University) (noting that in different 
geographic markets, hospital mergers have been shown to increase prices by anywhere from five 
percent to over fifty percent).  
79 For a thoughtful study of the information consumers need to choose insurance plans, see Erik 
J. Johnson et al., Can Consumers Make Affordable Care Affordable? The Value of Choice 
Architecture, 8 PLOS ONE 1 (2013).  
80 Most insurers keep their provider payment systems proprietary. Even government employers 
often sign nondisclosure agreements if they receive information from insurers as well as third party 
administrators and management consultants; were it not for these nondisclosure agreements, provider 
payment data could be subject to FOIA requests. 
81 Steven Brill, Why Medical Bills Are Killing Us, TIME, Feb. 20, 2013, at 1, 16-55.  
82 Medicare’s governing legislation requires CMS to set physician payment rates annually. Social 
Security Act §1848(d). The statutory formula for Sustainable Growth Rates (SGR) has required 
reductions in payment rates since 2002, but Congress has postponed enforcement of those reductions 
annually. Were the cumulative reductions to take effect in 2014, Medicare payments to physicians 
would decline by about twenty-four percent. Letter from Jonathan D. Blum, Principal Deputy 
Administrator, Ctrs. For Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to Glenn M. Hackbarth, Chair, Medicare 
Payment Advisory Comm’n (Mar. 11, 2014), available at http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-
Fee-for-Service-Payment/SustainableGRatesConFact/downloads/medpacfinal.pdf; Sustainable Growth 
Rates and Conversion Factors, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (last modified Apr. 15, 
2014), http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/SustainableGRatesConFact/ 
index.html?redirect=/sustainablegratesconfact/01_overview.asp. Some of the estimated federal 
savings expected from ACA reforms were based on the assumption that Medicare would reduce its 
costs by implementing the SGR. Recently, legislators began to consider whether to replace the fee for 
service physician payment structure with methods that reward quality and cost saving, like the 
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such organizations accept the financial risk of providing care raises additional 
questions for insurance regulation.
83
 States may have to decide whether to regulate 
providers who accept risk (through an accountable care organization, for example) 
as insurers or impose alternative requirements to ensure their financial soundness.
84
  
B. WHO DECIDES WHAT COVERAGE IS OFFERED AND PAID FOR? 
A threshold question for any social insurance system is what coverage must be 
offered. While the ACA intends to provide more uniform coverage through its 
requirement for Essential Health Benefits (EHB),
85
 the decisions most important to 
patients—what treatment their own insurance will pay for when they get sick—turn 
out to be more complex under the ACA’s financing structure than under a national, 
public social insurance system. 
What qualifies as essential care is a question that has vexed policy makers for 
decades.
86
 A threshold question is: essential for whom? An individual’s view of 
what is essential care may differ from a societal perspective. Moreover, different 
individuals may have different opinions on what is essential. Some may value 
quality of life more than length of life, while others prefer the opposite.
87
 Some may 
prefer care that maintains or restores normal function, while others simply want to 
survive, regardless of disability.
88
 Some may think of healthcare as limited only to 
services that diagnose, treat or cure disease, while others may include services to 
prevent illness or even achieve optimal health status. Furthermore, an individual’s 
own preference may vary, depending upon whether she acts as a consumer buying 
insurance or a patient in need of care for herself or a loved one.
89
  
                                                                                                                      
bundled payments used for hospital services or global payments for accountable care organizations. 
Gail R. Wilenksy, Improving Value in Medicare with an SGR Fix, 370 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 1 (2014).  
For Medicare programs, see Innovation Models, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 
http://innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/index.html#views=models (last visited May 8,2014). Agreements 
between CMS and provider ACOs under the Medicare Shared Savings Program allow the provider 
organization to share savings (reductions in the amount of Medicare payments to the ACO from 
payment amounts in an earlier benchmark period) without subjecting ACOs to risk for financial losses 
from providing care. Patient Protection & Affordable Care Act § 3022, 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj (2012). 
Regulations and Guidance on the Medicare Shared Savings Program may be found at 
http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/sharedsavingsprogram/Statutes_ 
Regulations_Guidance.html. CMS may consider adding shared risk in its new Innovation Program;  see 
42 U.S.C. § 1315a.  CMS issued a Request for Information seeking suggestions by March 1, 2014, for 
new ACO models that encourage greater care integration and financial accountability. CTRS. FOR 
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID INNOVATION, REQUEST FOR 
INFORMATION: EVOLUTION OF ACO INITIATIVES AT CMS 1 (2014), available at 
http://innovation.cms.gov/Files/x/Pioneer-RFI.pdf.  
83 For a discussion of earlier experiences with regulating risk-bearing providers, see Allison 
Overbay & Mark A. Hall, Insurance Regulation of Providers that Bear Risk, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 361 
passim (1996). 
84 For one state’s proposal to impose tiered levels of financial requirements on providers who 
accept varying levels of risk, see 1251 Mass. Reg. 20 (Jan. 3, 2014).   
85 42 U.S.C. § 18022 (2012). See Part IV.B.1, infra.  
86 See generally DANIEL CALLAHAN, WHAT KIND OF LIFE: THE LIMITS OF MEDICAL PROGRESS 
(1990); NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE (1985); VICTOR R. FUCHS, WHO SHALL LIVE? 
HEALTH, ECONOMICS, AND SOCIAL CHOICE (1974); EDMOND D. PELLIGRINO & DAVID C. 
THOMASMA, FOR THE PATIENT’S GOOD: THE RESTORATION OF BENEFICENCE IN HEALTH CARE 
(1988).  
87 See CALLAHAN, supra note 86, at 18-20.  
88 See DANIELS, supra note 86, at 2-5.  
89 Wendy K. Mariner, Standards of Care and Standard Form Contracts: Distinguishing Patient 
Rights and Consumer Rights in Managed Care, 15 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 12-18 (1998). 
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Societal level views of essential care also vary. Indeed, one could question 
whether some societies accurately or adequately represent any consensus on the part 
of their populations. Where governments act honestly, essential care could properly 
be based on many different factors, such as population size, age distribution, and 
available resources. What is essential to any society may also depend on its need for 
economic growth, which may favor services that preserve productivity, or 
participation in civic life, which may favor other services, or some other human 
function. But, given the variation in individual preferences in a population as diverse 
as that of the United States, any societal level choice, no matter how thoughtfully 
produced, may conflict in whole or in part with the views of individuals or groups 
within the population.  
1. Essential Health Benefits under the ACA 
Majority rule may—or may not—be the appropriate normative standard to 
determine essential care at the more abstract level of general categories of coverage. 
The ACA appears to assume that it is by requiring private insurers to cover EHB in 
all plans that they offer to sell on a health insurance exchange or in the individual 
and small group market (but excluding grandfathered plans of large employers).
90
 
EHB  must be similar in scope to a “typical employer plan” and must include the 
following ten categories of medical services: ambulatory; emergency; inpatient 
hospitalization; maternity and newborn; mental health and substance abuse; 
prescription drugs; rehabilitation; laboratory; preventive; and pediatric (including 
dental and vision care).
91
 The Federal Secretary of Health and Human Services is 
charged with defining EHB, and is required to take the following specific 
“considerations” into account:
 
the categories must be balanced, without giving undue 
weight to any one category; coverage should not discriminate on the basis of age, 
disability, or expected length of life; EHB should take into account the needs of 
diverse groups, including women, children, and people with disabilities; benefits 
should not be denied on the basis of age, expected length of life, present or predicted 
disability, degree of medical dependency, or quality of life.
92
 
This general definition of EHB is quite comprehensive, and the “considerations” 
make it difficult to narrow the categories or to make decisions about how they might 
apply to individual patients.
93
 So far, this rather vague and flexible definition of 
EHBs is based on state choices of typical small employer plan coverage—in effect, 
trickling up from insurers.
94
 But it does represent a step toward developing 
                                                 
90 42 U.S.C. §§ 18021-18022 (2012).  
91 Id. § 18022(b)(1).   
92 Id. § 18022(b)(4).  
93 Not surprisingly, the Secretary avoided listing specific benefits, instead issuing a rule granting 
the states the opportunity to decide what benefits plans will cover in their states. Essential Health 
Benefits, Actuarial Value, and Accreditation, 78  Fed. Reg. 12,833-12,872 (Feb. 25, 2013) (to be 
codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 147, 155-56). A state may choose one of several existing health plans sold to 
small employers in that state (called a “benchmark plan”), and the benefits covered by that plan will 
be deemed to qualify as EHB. The benchmark plan, however, must be supplemented if it fails to cover 
any of the 10 required categories. Id.  
94 See id. While ACA states that Essential Health Benefits should be similar in scope to the 
benefits covered by a “typical employer plan,” it does not dist inguish between large employer plans 
and small employer plans. Small employer plans typically offer fewer benefits and more limited 
coverage of those benefits than large employer plans in order to keep premiums affordable. Thus, a 
typical small employer plan usually has a lower actuarial value than a large employer plan. To counter 
rising premiums, companies have increased the amounts that employees pay for health plans—both 
the employee’s share of premiums and deductibles and co-payments for receiving care. See Steven 
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consensus on the basic types of care that should be available to all. The benefits 
covered by large employee group plans are already similar. Greater consensus on 
essential coverage may emerge in the future, ideally with public input, and national 
standards may begin to trickle down from the state or federal government to 
insurers. Experiments with Medicare and Medicaid coverage and provider payment 
methods also may begin to incorporate the same or similar conception of essential 
health benefits, so that benefit packages in both public and private health plans may 
converge more closely than in the past.
95
 Of course, supplementary private insurance 
and personal funds will undoubtedly remain available to pay for elective and 
boutique services. Nonetheless, similar public and private benefit packages would 
reinforce consensus on what counts as care to which everyone should have access.
 
Similar coverage across many plans facilitates comparisons for consumers. In 
theory, consumers need only compare prices for the same set of benefits. In health 
insurance, however, a plan’s participating providers are also a major factor in 
consumers’ choice of health plans, even if often secondary to price.  
2. Coverage and Treatment Decisions – Contracts Again  
Paradoxically, variation in EHB definitions can perpetuate a problem that the 
EHB requirement itself was intended to resolve or at least reduce—inconsistent or 
inadequate treatment coverage. Historically, the fact that different insurers covered 
different benefits meant that people with the same medical condition would not 
necessarily receive the same treatment.
96
 The remaining variation among the several 
public benefit programs and hundreds of private insurance plans can provoke 
complaints of unfair rationing, especially if a person who is denied treatment 
believes that the denial was not based on medical need, but on an insurer’s profit 
targets.
97
 More uniform coverage of the same benefits could avoid the rationing 
charge by assuring that everyone is subject to the same rules. The knowledge that 
resources are being used for a public purpose, such as providing needed education or 
                                                                                                                      
Blakely, Employers, Workers, and the Future of Employment-Based Health Benefits, 330 EMP. 
BENEFIT RES. INST. 4 (2010). The ACA, however, limits out-of-pocket co-payments. 42 U.S.C. § 
18022(c)(2). Moreover, a small employer may have few affordable choices, so its plan may not cover 
the benefits that employees prefer. However, since the majority of people who will be entering the 
market are individuals and employees of small businesses, it may make sense to use a small employer 
plan as a benchmark. 
95  See, e.g., Additional Information on Proposed State Essential Health Benefits Benchmark 
Plans, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Data-
Resources/ehb.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2014); Michelle Lilienfeld, Overview of HHS’ Proposed Rule 
on Benefits for the Medicaid Expansion Population: A Step Guide for Advocates , NAT’L HEALTH LAW 
PROGRAM (Apr. 1, 2013), http://www.healthlaw.org/issues/medicaid/health-reform-and-
medicaid/overview-of-hhs-proposed-rule-on-benefits-for-the-medicaid-expansion-population-a-ste-
guideffor-advocates#.UymmYqDIpLE (discussing Medicaid Alternative Benefit Plans, which starting 
in 2014 are required to either meet all ten EHB benefit categories or be supplemented to make them 
comparable to a relevant EHB-based benchmark plan).  
96 See Amanda Cassidy, Essential Health Benefits, HEALTH AFF., HEALTH POL’Y BRIEF 1-2 (May 
2, 2013),. http://healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/healthpolicybrief_91.pdf (noting the 
historical absence of a uniform national standard for health insurance benefits and discussing the vast 
differences in coverage among plans before the Affordable Care Act required coverage of essential 
health benefits).  
97 See Normal Daniels, Why Saying No to Patients In The United States Is So Hard – Cost 
Containment, Justice and Provider Autonomy, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1380, 1383 (1986) (noting that 
patients are distrustful of health care schemes that make a profit through denial of care); Wendy K. 
Mariner, Rationing Health Care and the Need for Credible Scarcity, 85 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1439, 
1442 (1995) (“[Patients] may fear they are being denied care so that the money can be used to profit 
the organization.”).  
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services for children, can increase public acceptance of limits as a shared sacrifice . 
On one hand, the breadth of the statutory definition of EHB will make it difficult to 
limit the total package of benefits. On the other hand, the Secretary’s decision to use 
state-based benchmark plans to define EHB means that the details of each benefit 
category will continue to vary, so that individuals might still complain of unfair 
treatment, thereby threatening public acceptance.  
While the ACA intends to provide more uniform coverage of EHBs, the process 
of determining what kinds of care patients receive may not dramatically change for 
the foreseeable future. Most insurance plans and benefit programs necessarily define 
covered benefits in quite general terms much like the statutory definition of EHB. 
Given the breadth of required coverage, the decisions most important to patients    
—exactly what treatment will and will not be paid for within the general 
categories—remain with the insurer.  
Because the United States has so many different insurance plans, both the 
decision maker and the law governing the determination of claims for treatment 
vary. Federal government programs like Medicare prescribe general benefit 
categories in legislation, but specific determinations on whether and when specific 
items and services are covered are a matter of administrative law.
98
 The Department 
of Health and Human Services, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS) issues 
regulations and guidance interpreting the statute and describing what will and will 
not be paid for.
99
 However, the federal agency does not make decisions about 
individual patient care.
100
 Instead, CMS contracts with private contractors to do so 
on its behalf.
101
 Typically, these contractors are insurance companies, which have 
experience handling claims, usually because they have a separate private insurance 
business of their own.
102
 Different contractors handle claims in different regions of 
the country, so it is possible to have inconsistency in claims determination. In the 
case of disputes, patients have a statutory right to appeal the denial of payment to 
Medicare’s administrative appeals process, which is a unified federal system with 
greater consistency in results.
103
 
                                                 
98  See Barbara S. Klees et al., BRIEF SUMMARIES OF MEDICARE AND MEDICAID, CTRS. FOR 
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. 22 (2012), available at https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-
Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-
Reports/MedicareProgramRatesStats/Downloads/MedicareMedicaidSummaries2012.pdf (stating that 
federal authority to administer the Medicare and Medicaid systems has been delegated to, at various 
times, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Social Security Administration, the Social 
and Rehabilitation Service, and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services).   
99 See id. at 18 (organizations and agencies acting on behalf of the federal government apply 
Medicare coverage rules to determine appropriate payments);  Rulings, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance/Rulings/index.html (last 
modified Feb. 27, 2012, 2:24 PM).  
100 See Kathleen M. King & James Cosgrove, Medicare: Contractors and Private Plans Play a 
Major Role in Administering Benefits, GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 2-3 (Mar. 4, 2014), available 
at http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/661317.pdf (providing overview of how CMS contracts with 
Medicare Administrative Contractors and private organizations to provide various services); Klees et 
al., supra note 98, at 18 (discussing the role of contractors in determining which services are covered).  
101  See 42 C.F.R. § 405.920 (2013); Klees et al., supra note 98, at 18 (discussing fiscal 
intermediaries, which are organizations or agencies that contract with the federal government to 
process Medicare claims).  
102 See King & Cosgrove, supra note 100, at 2 (explaining that the Medicare fee-for-service 
program “was designed so that the federal government contracted with health insurers or similar 
private organizations experienced in handling physician and hospital cla ims to process and pay 
Medicare claims rather than having the federal government do so”).  
103 42 C.F.R. § 405.904.  
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Medicaid programs offer somewhat less consistency. Although Medicaid is a 
federal program with legislatively prescribed benefit categories, the states administer 
the program and can voluntarily, or with a federal waiver, cover additional or 
alternative benefits.
104
 Most state Medicaid programs make individual patient care 
determinations directly through a state Medicaid administrative agency.
105
 However, 
most states also contract with private insurers to enroll some Medicaid beneficiaries 
in a managed care plan.
106
 The insurer makes the initial benefit coverage 
determination for beneficiaries enrolled in its Medicaid plan.
107
 Disputes, however, 




Contract law governs individual benefit determinations for patients who are 
enrolled in private insurance plans. Despite drawing on many of the same common 
law principles, the judiciary in different states can apply somewhat different 
substantive and procedural rules with varying results. Claims determination often 
depends on specific contract provisions, especially those that exclude experimental 
procedures and those that limit coverage to treatments that are medically necessary 
for the individual patient.
109
 Here, decision-making is likely to continue to operate 
under a contract conception of insurance. That conception, however, does not 
necessarily produce consistent treatment determinations for patients in the same or 
similar circumstances. Indeed, doctrinal disputes that often occur in the context of 
all types of insurance policies will undoubtedly continue to arise with respect to 
claims determinations under health plans: the degree to which an insurance contract 
should be treated as a contract of adhesion,
110
 application of contra proferentem to 
construe ambiguous contract terms against the insurer as drafter,
111
 whether the 
parties are bound by the text of contract provisions or the reasonable expectations of 
the insured,
112
 the scope of subrogation clauses and whether state subrogation laws 
                                                 
104  See Klees et al., supra note 98, at 22 (“Within broad national guidelines established by 
Federal statutes, regulations, and policies, each State establishes its own eligibility standards; 
determines the type, amount, duration, and scope of services; sets the rate of payment for services; 
and administers its own program.”).  
105  Medicaid Administrative Claiming, MEDICAID.GOV, http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-
CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Financing-and-Reimbursement/Medicaid-Administrative-
Claiming.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2014).   
106  See id.; Klees et al., supra note 98, at 29; Managed Care, MEDICAID.GOV, 
http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Delivery-
Systems/Managed-Care/Managed-Care.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2014) (discussing trends in 
Medicaid, noting the growth of State-designed Medicaid managed care programs); Financing & 
Reimbursement, MEDICAID.GOV, http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-
Topics/Financing-and-Reimbursement/Financing-and-Reimbursement.html (last visited Mar. 25, 
2014) (noting that approximately seventy percent of Medicaid enrollees get care through a managed 
care delivery system). 
107 42 C.F.R. § 405.920.  
108 Id. § 405.908.  
109 See, e.g., Loyola Univ. of Chi. v. Humana Ins. Co., 996 F.2d 895, 897-901 (7th Cir. 1993) 
(analyzing whether a transplant was covered where the contract excludes procedures that do not meet 
the criteria for “medical necessity” and procedures that are “experimental” for the condition).  
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are preempted by Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),
113
 and the 




Most private insurers provide internal review (conducted by the insurer itself) of 
enrollee complaints, including disputes over benefit denials, and the ACA requires 
almost all insurers to offer a more transparent internal appeal process covering more 
categories of complaints.
115
 Enrollees who are dissatisfied with the internal review 
decision have very different options, depending on their particular insurer and plan. 
In theory, patients can sue a private insurer under state law for claims denials and 
other causes of action.
116
 However, the role of courts in determining claims has 
diminished somewhat in the past decade, for several reasons. Perhaps the most 
important has been the growing prevalence of mandatory arbitration clauses in 
private insurance contracts, which preclude an enrollee from bringing a lawsuit to 
require payment for treatment or to recover damages for negligence or other 
violations of law.
117
 The United States Supreme Court has also limited the causes of 
action available to patients who are enrolled in an employer’s group health plan.
118
 
Patients in such plans who claim wrongful denial of benefits must sue the 
employer’s plan under the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act, not 
state law.
119
 If successful, the patients are entitled to recover only the cost of the 
treatment denied and not any damages for personal injury.
120
 
A third reason for fewer court actions is the growth of external review systems. 
Almost all states now require insurers to submit certain disputes to a review panel 
that is entirely independent of the insurer.
121
 Having one’s claim reviewed by an 
unbiased expert or group of experts often satisfies patients that their claims have 
been evaluated fairly, regardless of the outcome.
122
 The ACA greatly expands the 
use of external review panels, requiring their use for almost all insurers, except 
certain employer-sponsored group health plans.
123
  
The ACA leaves in place a multiplicity of processes and decision-makers for 
determining individual claims, including public administrative procedures, private 
review procedures, private arbitration, and judicial process.
124
 The Act does not 
specify how decisions are made in individual cases. With rising healthcare costs, 
both public and private insurers are likely to face pressure to make sure that they pay 
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123  42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19(b) (Supp. 2011); Internal Claims, Appeals & External Review 
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only for care that offers value for money.
125
 Thus, different decision makers may 
continue to produce different interpretations of what individual patients are entitled 
to under their different health plans.
126
 Even where courts issue opinions, their 
decisions often focus on the specific circumstances of an individual patient and 
therefore create little precedent for other individual decisions.
127
 
3. The Role of Costs 
Using health insurance as a financing mechanism has the potential to reshape 
the healthcare delivery system. Today’s healthcare system was strongly influenced 
by what health insurance plans covered and excluded and how much they paid 
providers.
128
 A financing system must decide what services are worth paying for and 
how much to pay for them. Ultimately, healthcare must be affordable to everyone, 
not just those who voluntarily buy insurance. With everyone in the system, savings 
cannot be achieved by risk selection or exclusion from coverage, as with voluntary, 
commercial insurance. Contributions or premiums of individuals in the group need 
not correspond to their individual risks; individual contributions, whether in 
premiums or taxes, may be relatively equal or income based, as long as aggregate 
revenues are available to pay for the needs of everyone in the group.
129
 
This means increased pressure to control healthcare costs, with greater scrutiny 
of payments to providers and taking value more explicitly into account.
130
 Although 
a major impetus for the Act was the growing cost of care,
131
 the ACA does not 
expressly require either reductions or changes in the method of payment for 
healthcare.
132
 Instead, supporters believe that once everyone is insured, the country 
will have no choice but to take affirmative steps to control costs.
133
 Since most of the 
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President in State of the Union Address, WHITE HOUSE OFF. PRESS SECRETARY (Jan. 27, 2010), 
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ACA’s reforms do not take effect until 2014, noticeable cost control is unlikely for 
many years.
134
 Competing goals of essential coverage and affordable costs have 
already challenged the process of making Medicare coverage decisions
135
 and 
developing a standard Essential Health Benefits package.
136
 This means that the 
rising cost of care will significantly affect the kind of care that insurance actually 
pays for, at least for some years to come.  
In practice, insurers still bear primary responsibility for controlling costs, but 
their options are limited. The requirement that insurers cover EHB, however defined, 
constrains insurers’ ability to limit benefits as a way to control costs. The ACA also 
limits the permissible extent of cost-sharing for patients, which is another traditional 
way to shift costs.
137
 In principle, insurers could reduce their own administrative 
costs and profits, but new regulations, such as reporting requirements,
138
 may add to 
administrative efforts, and for-profit companies are under pressure from investors to 
increase profits.
139
 One ACA skeptic argues that the ACA’s requirement that 
insurers spend at least eighty percent of premiums on benefits could backfire by 
encouraging insurers to increase premiums and cover more services for the purpose 
of preserving executive compensation and profit levels.
140
  
This leaves provider payments as a primary target for controlling costs. 
Although payment is a strong influence on provider behavior, it remains a crude 
instrument for reducing waste. Insurers do not necessarily have the expertise to fine-
tune payment mechanisms to achieve both financial efficiency and medical 
effectiveness in individual treatment decisions. This raises the question, noted 
above, of whether insurance regulators should assume responsibility for overseeing 
insurer payments to providers.
141
 To complicate matters, if providers in ACOs are 
responsible for providing care, but specific items and services are not specified in 
the contract, it will be providers who make the decisions about exactly what the 
patient receives.
142
 In case of a dispute, who is responsible—the insurer, the 
provider, or both? Such questions are reminiscent of earlier controversies over 
medical necessity determinations by managed care organizations.
143
 Should it matter 
whether the provider has accepted full or partial financial risk for patient care? If the 
                                                 
134 Massachusetts, which has six years of experience with the model for the ACA, recognized the 
need for cost control early on, but enacted payment reform only in 2012. An Act Improving the 
Quality of Health Care and Reducing Cost through Increased Transparency, Efficiency, and 
Innovation, 2012 Mass. Acts ch. 224. Although Massachusetts will not directly control pricing or 
costs—and cannot control federal payers—the state will set targets for average total per person 
medical spending growth and require organizations that exceed the targets to submit plans for cost -
saving measures. Id.  
135  Peter J. Neumann & James D. Chambers, Medicare’s Enduring Struggle to Define 
“Reasonable and Necessary” Care, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1775, 1777 (2012).  
136  CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS BULLETIN 3 
(2011), available at 
https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Files/Downloads/essential_health_benefits_bulletin.pdf.  
137 42 U.S.C. § 18022(c) (2012). It also prohibits lifetime and annual limits on claims payouts, 
which limit the risk that the insurer accepts, but are not true methods of cost -shifting. Id. § 300gg-11.   
138 Id. §§ 300gg-17-18.  
139 See generally WENDELL POTTER, DEADLY SPIN: AN INSURANCE COMPANY INSIDER SPEAKS 
OUT ON HOW CORPORATE PR IS KILLING HEALTH CARE AND DECEIVING AMERICANS (1st ed. 2010). 
140 GOLDHILL, supra note 44, at 188. 
141 See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text. 
142 See supra note 82.  
143 See generally MARC A. RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY & MORALS (1st ed. 1993); Mark A. Hall 
et al., Judicial Protection of Managed Care Consumers: An Empirical Study of Insurance Coverage 
Disputes, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 1055, 1055-68 (1996). 
214 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE VOL. 40 NO. 2&3 2014 
insurance department regulates providers who accept risk, should the department 
also regulate individual treatment decisions?  
V. CONCLUSION 
Over the past four decades, health insurance has evolved from its original 
indemnity structure into the primary means of paying for healthcare. The ACA 
gathers various public benefit programs and private insurance plans into a loosely 
knit but near universal healthcare payment system. This framework combines 
aspects of several conceptions of insurance to create a peculiarly American form of 
social insurance distinct from any single conception.
144
  
The ACA is intended to provide near-universal health insurance coverage for 
the purpose of enabling Americans to obtain needed medical care. In this respect, 
health insurance performs a governance function by financing and distributing 
healthcare. The ACA seeks greater consistency in health insurance coverage by 
regulating the terms of most plans. Such requirements bear some resemblance to 
product standards in a product conception of insurance. The ACA also regulates the 
commercial practices of private insurers, suggesting that private health insurance 
industry is being treated—and should be regulated to some extent—like a modern 
public utility.  
The requirement that private health insurance plans sold on the new health 
insurance exchanges cover Essential Health Benefits is a major step toward greater 
consistency in coverage across the population. However, that requirement does not 
apply to all health plans, and the current definition of Essential Health Benefits lacks 
specification. As a result, decisions about covered care at the patient level will 
continue to be made by many different decision makers, just as they are now. Each 
decision maker, whether public or private, will continue to determine—according to 
different rules of procedure and interpretation—whether the general categories of 
benefits include something that a provider recommends or a patient seeks. At the 
level of payment for patient care, health insurance is likely to operate within the 
contract conception of insurance.  
The ACA should challenge us to think in terms of a new conception of health 
insurance that could help answer the remaining questions about how to regulate 
insurers and their plans. Abraham warns that no single conception of insurance 
provides fully developed normative standards, at least for interpreting the meaning 
of insurance policies.
145
 Yet, the ACA has taken the first step in the process to 
provide general standards for health insurance coverage. The next step is to 
reevaluate the normative standards in insurance law that govern what insurers must 
do for insureds at the level of patient care. 
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